Would Baghdad fall quickly?

Thomas E. Ricks, writing for The Washington Posts asks, Would Baghdad fall quickly?

The two generals are concerned that the Wolfowitz school may underestimate the risks involved, the officials said. They have argued that planning should prepare thoroughly for worst-case scenarios, most notably one that planners have labeled “Fortress Baghdad,” in which Hussein withdraws his most loyal forces into the Iraqi capital and challenges the United States to enter into protracted street fighting, perhaps involving chemical or biological weapons.

I see "Fortress Baghdad" as more than a worst-case scenario. It's a very likely occurence. Too many warbloggers think this war will be like the first installment. The Gulf War was fought mostly out in the open desert, with the bulk of the Iraqi military consisting of lightly armed and poorly trained draftees holding down the front lines, with the officers, of course, consisting of professional military. The infantry on the front lines were largely a bunch of farmers, accountants and factory workers with no real desire to go to war and nothing to gain from fighting American troops. Saddam's real military, with the exception of those officers and staff NCO's captured on the front, headed back to Iraq when it became clear that the frontlines would not hold.

This excursion will be a much different affair. The folks who rolled over and surrendered in 1991 may not be so quick to do so when American bombs start landing on their homes and businesses. Further, we will not be able to keep the bulk of the fighting outside city limits. Iraqi troops will be stationed in hospitals, schools, mosques, anywhere and everywhere.

How quickly Iraq falls will depend on how "dirty" the Administration is willing to fight. A quick victory can likely only be ensured via massive civilian casualties and war crimes. The question is, will the Administration take that route?

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This entry also posted at Stand Down.

7 comments

  1. “How quickly Iraq falls” to US armed forces, will only be the beginning of our problems. Even if Iraqi armed forces collapse in a day, that will not guarantee us a peaceful occupation.

    Look at the West Bank: Israel’s army is the undisputed master of the region, and no other force exists to challenge its power. But is there peace there? Is anyone safe?

    Posted by Dave on December 18, 2002 01:54 PM

  2. The Iraqis will also probably fight more willingly for Saddam his time around. America won its war and the bombs still kept dropping. Whats to stop them from thinking the same about this one? In a lose lose scenario I think there gonna lose with a bang instead of a wimper.

    Posted by Theo on December 18, 2002 03:07 PM

  3. I dislike this sort of argument. The US is hands down the greatest army in the world, and Saddam Hussien is not going to muster a mighty force and stop us dead in our tracks. On desert terrain, there is nowhere to hide. Kandahar did not take a long time to fall, and neither should Baghdad, no matter what sort of poorly equipped army Hussien can manage to recruit. What is going to be difficult is occupation, keeping the peace, destroying the last vestiges of the enemy and any new enemies that might arise. This takes more then the slam-bang approach that can win wars, this is the strategic weakness of the war on Iraq.

    Posted by The Littlest Cynic on December 18, 2002 07:19 PM

    1. Agreeing with the Littlest Cynic, me.

      The problem with the “Fortress Baghdad” scenario as an anti-war argument is that it assumes the US would want to limit collateral damage to the Iraqi civilian population, and try to go mano a mano against Iraqi troops. I think a simple thought experiment will disprove that: put yourself in a military planner’s position Your have to figure out how to:

      1. Take the city
      2. Grab command, control, and communication facilities.

      The solution is easy: blow up anything that’s not a C-cubed facility, and save bare knuckle fighting for when you get inside of one.

      I’m sure there are many good faith humanitarian interventionists, i.e., people who sincerely believe we are going there to help and that we want to minimize death and destruction among the civilian population. Nothing could be further from the truth, and they need to know that.

      Posted by Curtiss Leung on December 19, 2002 12:15 PM

      1. Curtiss: First, it seems pretty obvious to me that the US does indeed want to limit collateral damage, if only to maintain a good image and not lose international support too soon.

        Second, you fail to demonstrate what “blow[ing] up anything that’s not a C-cubed facility” would accomplish, since destroying the C-cubed facilities first would weaken the Iraqi troops in advance of “try[ing] to go mano a mano” against them, whatever you might mean by that.

        Third, why would US troops want to “get inside of” C-cubed facilities, rather than destroy them from the air before our troops arrive on the ground?

        Posted by Dave on December 19, 2002 02:30 PM

        1. “First, it seems pretty obvious to me that the US does indeed want to limit collateral damage, if only to maintain a good image and not lose international support too soon.”

          They didn’t minimize it in the first war, for sure. Why would they change their minds now?

          Posted by The Littlest Cynic on December 19, 2002 05:28 PM

        2. Dave: regarding colleratal damage, see Anthony Cordesman’s remarks at http://www.csis.org/features/iraq_wound.pdf, in particular the section entitled “The Best Case War Syndrome.” The section is worth quoting in full:

          (start)
          “Far too often, we now base our postwar plans only on fighting a best-case war. We have no justification for such planning. We may get serious urban fighting. We may see the use of WMD. We may have to sharply escalate and inflict serious collateral damage. We may see factional struggles and warlords emerge, and we already are caught up in a messy struggle between the Kurds and exile groups like the INC.

          “No plan is worth considering that does not explicitly examine what can go wrong in the fighting and how it will impact on the post-fighting outcome.”
          (end)

          This is not an anti-war screed, but a purely practical documenton what to expect in fighting and occupying Iraq. This is, ofc ourse, only one person’s work, but Cordesman’s vita (at http://www.csis.org/html/4cordesm.htm) indicates a connected and influential policy intellectual, so I think it’s fair to say his views are representative.

          As far as destroying C-cubed facilities go, I think destroying them as the first order of battle would be a terrible mistake. You would cut the enemy’s communications to their troops and facilities at the cost of being able to track them centrally, which will certainly draw out ground fighting, and, after battle is over, you’d have to rebuild them completely.

          Posted by Curtiss Leung on December 19, 2002 05:29 PM

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