Contemporary Issues in the Persian Gulf I
American Military University
Prior to the launch of the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the U.S. and U.K., weapons of mass destruction and the probability of Saddam’s use of said weapons were among the most popular topics in Beltway policy wonk and political blogging circles. As a former Marine, Gulf War veteran and active civil libertarian, I had assumed the unofficial role of an assistant public relations officer for Veterans for Common Sense, a non-partisan veterans advocacy organization. While not directly representing VCS, I participated in a press conference on March 6, 2003 at the National Press Club on “Troops Not Prepared for Bio-Chem Attacks.” Speaking alongside me were veterans from several services and conflicts: Representatives John Conyers and Jim McDermott, Stephen L. Robinson of the National Gulf War Resource Center, Col. Carl Bernard and veteran author Christian Bauman, among others.
At the heart of our discussion was a U.S. Army Inspector General report regarding the misplacement of 250,000 faulty gasmasks, most likely mixed in with the current inventory used by Soldiers preparing for the Iraq conflict. Needless to say, we were quite concerned about Saddam’s possible possession of chemical weapons and effectiveness of our service men and women’s protective gear. As I pointed during the conference, and had constantly been reminded by experienced NCOs and SNCOs during my active duty experiences, “ always remember, your equipment was manufactured by the lowest bidder.” As I had previously pointed out in my last journal entry, during six years on active duty I had yet to test with a functioning gasmask. As I also pointed out, this was not unusual.
Once the raid on Baghdad occurred without our troops getting gassed, I was at first relieved, and later enraged. The Administration made it quite clear that the primary reason for invading Iraq was to dismantle their weapons of mass destruction and remove Saddam as a threat to the region. Setting aside political issues of whether or not intelligence was cooked, I find myself still left with a combination of anger and relief. I am relieved that the Administration was wrong about the prevalence of chemical weapons and upset that the Administration was willing to commit troops to battle in spite of the Inspector General’s report and the prevalence of older equipment among the ranks.