May 30, 2005
Seeking Out Monsters: Ignoring the Advice of John Quincy Adams
American Military University
RQ 300, Research, Analysis and Writing
by James Landrith
Seeking Out Monsters: Ignoring the Advice of John Quincy Adams
American Military University
RQ 300, Research, Analysis and Writing
by James Landrith
Terrorism and Islamic nationalism are as much a product of religious extremism as they are a backlash to foreign intervention in the affairs of sovereign nations. This research paper will discuss the rise of Islamic nationalism and U.S. intervention in Middle Eastern politics in the late twentieth century. Further, it will examine the role U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of Middle Eastern nations played in the rise of Islamic nationalism.
As has been observed by many policy analysts and government officials, terrorism and Islamic nationalism are related to foreign intervention in the affairs of sovereign nations (Richman, 1991). Through the examination of key events, such as the Iran hostage crisis, the 1983 suicide bombing of 241 U.S. Marines, the Persian Gulf War and the events leading up to the destruction of the World Trade Center towers on September 11, 2001, it is clear that the role of U.S. foreign policy is as much a factor in such terrorist actions as Islamic extremism and anti-American sentiment. Contrary to popular sentiment among some conservative circles, Islamic terrorism towards the United States began after U.S. interference in Middle Eastern affairs, rather than as an indictment of democracy and American society (Bock, 1993).
As revealed through the works of research institutes and think tanks like the Independent Institute, Brookings Institution, Cato Institute and Future of Freedom Foundation, there is much to gain in terms of security and peace by following the advice of John Quincy Adams with regard to America not “going abroad in search of monsters to slay.”
Ignoring the Advice of John Quincy Adams
In recent years, American citizens have become increasingly worried about terrorism and the potential impact of a rise in Islamic nationalism in the Middle East on Western society. In tandem with this rising public concern, scholars, policy analysts and pundits have also been asking what role did U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of Middle Eastern nations play in the rise of Islamic nationalism.
Following the Al Qaeda attacks on New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania, many pundits and government officials viewed discussion of U.S. policy and its role in fueling anti-American sentiment as a taboo subject. However, Alan W. Bock (2003), author and Media Fellow at The Independent Institute believes that no discussion of terrorism and the Middle East is complete without a healthy examination of U.S. policy in the region.
Bock (2003) points out that while terrorism is not a justifiable response to U.S. intervention, it is important to understand how the two activities are related. It is in keeping with this sentiment that this paper will examine several key events such as such as the Iran hostage crisis, the 1983 suicide bombing of 241 U.S. Marines, the Persian Gulf War and the events leading up to the destruction of the World Trade Center towers on September 11, 2001 and their relation to U.S. foreign policy.
Beginning with U.S. intervention into the internal affairs of Iran and Iraq in the 1950s, a chain of events was set into motion that culminated in the destruction of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. According to Jonathan Victor Marshall (2002) of The Independent Institute, the United States directly participated in the bloody 1953 overthrow of Premier Mohammed Mossadeq, head of Iran’s elected government. This coup, known as Operation Ajax was coordinated by the Central Intelligence Agency and British intelligence and resulted in Iran’s elected government being placed back under the control of the son of a prior monarch (Marshall, 2002). In effect, the United States and the United Kingdom illegally overturned the election results of a sovereign nation, returning the monarch Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi to power (Marshall, 2002).
While the Shah’s new government was secular in many respects, it was also repressive towards its critics and highly corrupt due to the influence of oil money (Marshall, 2002). According to Marshall, over the next twenty-four years, the Shah would squander millions of dollars earned through oil sales on a variety of “exotic armaments” purchased from the United States and other nations. In addition, the new government’s secret police force, the Savak, would spend years imprisoning government critics and become an effective tool for stifling dissent (Marshall, 2002).
Included in the group of persecuted government critics was a fiery Shi-ite Muslim cleric named Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (Storey & Utter, 2002, p. 87). Right or wrong, the Ayatollah Khomeini attributed the Shah’s secularization of the Iranian government and progressive reforms to empower women in society as a byproduct of Iran’s long relationship with the United States government (Marshall, 2002). Further, he blamed the United States for the overthrow of Premier Mohammed Mossadeq (Richman, 1991).
Ayatollah Khomeini spent years rallying supporters and plotting the Shah’s overthrow. In 1979, Khomeini, aided by thousands of college students, succeeded in taking control of the Iranian government. The Ayatollah’s frequent anti-American rants prior to the revolution, combined with the Shah’s repressive Savak, had whipped up massive public furor against the United States. This sentiment resulted in the seizure of the American embassy and the long hostage ordeal endured by Americans present when the embassy was occupied by Khomeini’s supporters (Richman, 1991). This action by Ayatollah Khomeini would be the first in a series of embarrassing and violent repudiations of American foreign policy in the Middle East by heads of state and leaders of terrorist organizations. While the violent takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran and the long internment of the innocent American citizens within was not justified by the prior interventionist actions of the United States government and prior presidential administrations, it is pure folly to pretend that there is no relation between the two events.
Another major development which stands out is the tragic October 23, 1983 bombing of the Marine Barracks in Lebanon which cost the lives of 241 U.S. Marines (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1999, p. 294). The Marines in Beirut were participating in an international peacekeeping force which had been prompted by a prior bombing of the American embassy (USA Today, 2004). The bombing of the Marine barracks was eventually attributed to Hezbollah and judged by U.S. District Judge Royce C. Lamberth to have been funded by the government of Iran (CNN, 2003). In his ruling, Judge Lamberth described the bombing as “the most deadly state-sponsored terrorist attack made against United States citizens before September 11, 2001” (CNN, 2003).
The loss of 241 Marines in Lebanon, as well as lingering public criticism over the loss of life in Vietnam, lead to a significant change in formation and execution of American foreign policy with regard to the deployment and use of military force (Air Force Association, 1999). This change of policy is often referred to as the Weinberger Doctrine (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 1999, p. 294). The Weinberger Doctrine, authored by former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and later expanded upon by General Colin Powell essentially requires that several key concerns be addressed prior to any use of American ground troops in foreign conflicts (Danner, 1997).
While the Weinberger Doctrine looks good on paper, it is only effective if followed by those who plan and approve military actions. However, since the Weinberger Doctrine is purely philosophical, there is no statutory or regulatory attachment preventing the war-planners in the Pentagon, Congress or the president from completely ignoring its basic tenets. As such, it has been largely abandoned by both Congress and the administration as a policy litmus test since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
Key among the concerns addressed by the Weinberger Doctrine is that U.S. troops only be deployed if the presence of American force is required to safeguard U.S. interests. Further, the end goals of such use of force are only to be authorized when political and military goals have been set and only with the clear goal of winning the conflict (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 1999, p. 294). In addition, an exit strategy for removing U.S. troops is to be clearly defined in order to keep the operation or intervention on target and to minimize the occurrence of American casualties (Danner, 1997).
While the United States was intervening in the internal affairs of Iran, it was also heavily involved in those of its neighbor Iraq. Starting in 1958, the United States For instance, in 1963, the Central Intelligence Agency trained several Iraqi revolutionaries to act as assassins in attempt to overthrow General Abdul Qassim (Marshall, 2002). One of the young revolutionaries trained by the CIA was Saddam Hussein.
In 1968, Hussein became the second most powerful man in Iraq following another CIA sponsored military coup (Marshall, 2002). Further, Washington continued to support Hussein as he assumed control of the government in 1979. In addition, on September 9, 1980, Iraq invaded Iran in attempt to add to its oil assets (Fredriksen, 2001, p. 246). Hussein’s power grab at Iran was also fueled by exaggerated intelligence funneled through the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from the Carter Administration, which sought to provoke the conflict as a means of keeping the Ayatollah Khomeini occupied and in check (Richman, 1991). Further, President Carter was hopeful that war with Iraq would force Iran into a position of need with regard to equipment and spare parts that would force it to deal with the United States. Such an outcome could have been used to bargain for the release of the Americans being held hostage in Iran (Richman, 1991). However, rather than turning to the United States for spare parts and equipment, Iran instead sought the help of Vietnam. This failed attempt was a major setback in U.S. intervention policy with regard to Middle Eastern affairs.
The Iran-Iraq war would continue for nearly eight years before a cease-fire was declared. In addition, the Reagan Administration took several steps to tilt the scales in Iraq’s favor. For starters, Iraq was removed from the State Department’s terrorism supporters list. Second, the United States awarded $500 million in commodity credits to Iraq (Richman, 1991). Third, credit was supplied via the Export-Import Bank to construct a pipeline. This $1 billion in subsidies allowed Hussein’s regime to sink more money and resources into their war effort (Richman, 1991). Finally, the Reagan Administration encouraged other nations to provide equipment and money to Iraq (Richman, 1991). Further, prior to the war’s conclusion, the United States entered into the conflict on Iraq’s behalf by escorting their neighbor and then-ally Kuwait’s oil tankers through the Persian Gulf to protect them from Iranian naval vessels (Richman, 1991). The Reagan Administration’s choice to side with Iraq in this conflict was greatly complicated by Hussein’s liberal use of chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurds of Northern Iraq (Fredriksen, 2001, p. 247). By the war’s end, approximately 250,000 people were dead and billions of dollars were wasted on Hussein’s conquest for land and oil (Fredriksen, 2001, p. 247). Yet again, the United States had interfered in Middle Eastern nations and the result was a mess of death, devastation and fodder for extremists. This outcome caused further anger towards the United States among Islamic fundamentalists who saw the West’s support for the secular Iraqi government as an attack on Islam. None of the intended goals of the Carter and Reagan Administrations were achieved during the long and bloody conflict.
In 1990, Saddam Hussein once again began his futile quest for land and oil, this time focusing his attentions on the oilfields of former ally and neighbor Kuwait. On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and seized control of the capitol city and hundreds of oilfields. This bold move would prove both costly and foolhardy. On January 17, 1991, a combined task force made up of several nations, and led by the United States began bombing Hussein’s forces in Kuwait and Iraq (Fredriksen, 2001, p. 247). By the end of February, Hussein’s military was on the way out of Kuwait. This signaled the beginning of a long-term presence for American military units in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (Conry, 1994).
In a 2003 commentary, Bock points out that Saudi millionaire Osama bin Laden specifically spoke out against the presence of U.S. troops and bases in Saudi Arabia, home to Mecca and other Islamic holy sites. Bock is quick to point out that this may be an excuse of convenience for the Al Qaeda leader to justify his actions, but that it is “significant that he mentioned it.” Further, Bock (2003) points out that “U.S. foreign policy did play some role in motivating the attacks.”
Rather than simply parroting the familiar lines that the “evildoers” are lashing out at our “way of life” that has been repeated many times by President George W. Bush and several administration leaders and Members of Congress, it is far more prudent and enlightening to actually examine the grievances of bin Laden and his terrorist collaborators. In order to start this process, it is necessary to first explain the past nature of bin Laden’s relationship with the United States government.
U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan, the beginning of bin Laden’s disenchantment with the American government, began in 1980 during the Carter Administration (Storey and Utter, 90). Spurred to action by the Soviet Union’s December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan on the heels of the Afghani Communist Party’s overthrow of Prime Minister Daoud Khan, President Jimmy Carter released what came to be known as the Carter Doctrine in his January 1980 State of the Union speech (Eland, 1991). The Carter Doctrine, meant to counter Soviet designs on dominating the Persian Gulf, stated that any such attempts at dominance “will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States.”
In order to carry out the main tenet of the Carter Doctrine, U.S. financial, military and intelligence aid was provided to the Afghan rebels (Eland, 1991). During the same period, Saudi millionaire Osama bin Laden entered the conflict on the same side as the United States (Storey and Utter, 90). This mutual struggle to push the Soviets out led to significant contact and cooperation between American intelligence agencies and bin Laden and his organization in Afghanistan. At first, bin Laden’s role was that of an international fundraiser and charitable benefactor on behalf of the rebels. However, that role soon morphed from one of a sympathetic supplier of equipment and funds to a more military related post. For instance, in 1984 bin Laden funded and created a military base on the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan in the town of Peshawar (Storey & Utter, 2002, p. 91). In addition, the CIA decided to support an effort in 1986 by Pakistan to recruit “radical Muslims” to support the Afghan mujahedeen (Marshall, 2002). Osama bin Laden was one of the “radical Muslims” who answered the call, which began the future terrorist’s relationship with the CIA.
Over the next five years, bin Laden established close ties with several powerful local Afghan clerics and leaders. Many of these clerics harbored anti-American views, such as Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman (Storey & Utter, 2002, p. 91). Abdel-Rahman, an Egyptian cleric, is currently in prison in the United States for his role in the 1993 Al Qaeda bombing of the World Trade Center (Storey & Utter, 2002, p. 91). Once the Soviets departed Afghanistan, bin Laden, influenced by radical Islamic clerics like Abdel-Rahman, turned his attention and growing network towards the other superpower involved in Middle Eastern affairs, the United States (Storey & Utter, 2002, p. 91).
Following the 1991 Gulf War, bin Laden was expelled from Saudi Arabia for openly challenging the Saudi royals over their military relationships with the United States. In particular, bin Laden’s newly forged radical mindset found the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia to be an insult to Islam (Storey & Utter, 2002, p. 91).
In 1991, bin Laden moved his network to Sudan and remained there until the Sudanese government forced him out due to pressure from the United States and Saudi Arabia (Mylroie, 2000, p. 222). Over the next decade, bin Laden and his associates would be linked to several terrorist actions against the United States and Saudi Arabia including the bombing of several American embassies in Africa, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the attack on the U.S.S. Cole and the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania.
While the terrorist tactic of targeting innocent civilians is not justified by American meddling in Middle Eastern affairs, it is a real consequence of ignoring the advice of President John Quincy Adams (2001) to not venture abroad in search of monsters to destroy. For instance, J. Victor Marshall (2002) cautions that the “United States cannot afford to breed more hatred and resentment” via world policeman efforts such as those taking place now in Iraq. Over the last 50 years, successive U.S. presidents have managed to create as many monsters as they’ve destroyed, while adding the nasty side-effects of an increase in international terrorism and a rise in Islamic nationalism. Currently, the United States government has developed and maintained close ties with the repressive governments of Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who systematically suppress free speech among other human rights violations (Eland, 2004). Further, the Bush Administration’s extremely close ties to General Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan are beginning to resemble that of previous administrations with Saddam Hussein and the Shah of Iran (Eland, 2005).
In spite of the commonly accepted explanations for international terrorism committed by Islamic extremists, the causes are far more complex than simple hatred for American culture. As illustrated through the works of policy analysts with the Cato Institute, Independent Institute and other institutions, American interventionist actions are far more to blame as contributing factors than any real or imagined hatred of Western society.
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